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Review: Ralph Wedgwood, The Value of Rationality, OUP 2017, 267pp. 
By Joseph Raz, Columbia University and KCL 
 
The book is the first of a planned trilogy, with Rationality and Belief and Rationality and 
Choice to follow, titles which signal Wedgwood’s view that one concept of rationality applies 
across the practical and epistemic domains. The book’s chapters deal with a variety of 
disparate issues (e.g., ‘ought implies can’, the nature of reasons, the meaning of ‘ought’, the 
structure of virtue, the virtue of rationality, comparative values), each well worth studying 
for its own sake, and each explored with reference to the history of the subject, and to 
some of the relevant discussions. Yet, together they combine into a theory of rationality and 
its value. Wedgwood is developing a theory of the concept in order to understand the 
property it expresses. The concept is used primarily to evaluate mental states (belief, 
intention) and events (decision, judgement), an evaluation that is based purely on the 
degree to which the mental states and events present in the thinker’s mind at or shortly 
before the relevant time (internalism), constitute a coherent pattern. Norms of rationality, 
i.e. principles specifying what rationality requires, are constitutive of the mental state to 
which they apply.  I assume that that means that what makes the mental state one of that 
kind is that certain requirements of rationality apply to it, those that apply to the kind. 
Wedgwood underlines another aspect: each type of mental state and event that can be 
rational has an aim, and thinking rationally is a means to satisfying the end. Beliefs aim at 
truth and choice aims at the practicable good. The means to the ends are mental states that 
are correct, that is, ones that conform to norms of correctness that are themselves 
constitutive of the types of mental state, though they evaluate mental states by their 
relations to the external world. Both rationality and correctness come in degrees. The more 
irrational a person’s ways of thinking are the more incorrect his thinking is likely to be. 
 In my view Wedgwood limits his achievement by misidentifying his topic. “To think 
rationally is to think as one should” (1), he writes, encouraging the hope that he will 
conceive of rationality as the virtue of reason, a virtue manifested in the proper exercise of 
rational powers. However, ‘rationality’, as Wedgwood understands it, is confined to “the 
proper use of our reasoning faculties” (32), and important as the reasoning faculties are, 
they are only part of our rational faculties, which include powers of concentration, 
attention, decisiveness, discrimination, sensitivity and more.  
Equally, if not more damaging to his ambition is his claim that the proper use of our 
reasoning faculties is judged by the outcome of their use, which leads him to identify 
rationality with a pattern of mental states and events. In fact, failure to reason properly is 
manifested in the manner of reasoning and not in its results. One’s reasoning may be faulty, 
even irrational, when the result is fortunate (and, say, displays the right pattern). Reasoning 
in a reckless, inattentive, negligent etc. manner is irrational whatever the result. However, 
Wedgwood is right to point out that for the most part studies of rationality in decision 
theory and formal epistemology are taken to be a study of the coherence of (some) mental 
states, and one of his aims is to provide an account that applies to those disciplines. 
 Wedgwood regards as his main challenge to explain the relevance of coherence to 
rationality. “The norms of rationality are both pervasive … and have an inescapable grip on 
us - we necessarily already have a disposition to conform to them. However, it is puzzling 
how there can be any norms of this sort that evaluate mental events purely on the basis of 
coherence. Why does coherence matter? Surely it is nothing more than just a pretty pattern 
of mental states. Why is it a matter of any importance whatsoever whether one’s mental 
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states form this pretty pattern or not?” (4) The reader has to wait to the last couple of 
chapters for Wedgwood’s answer. First, he turns to his thesis that there is only one concept 
of rationality – a view that can be properly debated only when we confront at least two 
conflicting accounts of rationality and the question arises whether at least one of them is 
mistaken or whether perhaps both are correct accounts of different concepts of rationality, 
both of which have their legitimate uses. Then he turns to the first of several arguments 
that the concept of rationality is a normative concept: “There is a way of using the terms 
‘rational’ and ‘justified’ so that phrases like ‘rational belief’ mean exactly the same thing as 
‘justified belief’ … in this book, I shall be using the terms ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ in this way. 
But the term ‘justified’ surely expresses a normative concept.” (26-7) More significant is the 
observation: “To use our faculty of reason ‘properly’ is to use it as it should be used. When a 
belief or a choice derives from the proper use of this faculty it thereby has what in the 
broadest sense could be called a kind of virtue or excellence - a feature in virtue of which 
beliefs (and the like) can count as good, or worthy of a certain kind of commendation”. (25-
6) Moreover, “it seems plausible that irrationality is always and necessarily some kind of 
defect or flaw or blemish … This makes it plausible that it is a conceptual truth that 
irrationality is some kind of defect or flaw.” (26) So, the concept of rationality is itself a 
normative concept. 
At a minimum these points show that ‘x is rational’ is commonly used to indicate that a 
certain standard has been met, and ‘x is irrational’ to indicate that a certain standard was 
not met. Furthermore, the standards are embedded in familiar contexts that are part and 
parcel of ordinary life (unlike, e.g., an invented game with its own standards), and rationality 
has to do with success in the use of some skill or ability. Correct spelling or pronunciation 
are similar examples. And there is no objection to claiming that they are normative 
concepts, if that is what the term is used to convey. But Wedgwood takes rationality to 
convey something more than that: That rationality is a normative concept implies “(a) 
rational mental states … [and] events are in a way good, or worthy of commendation; (b) if a 
thinker is rationally required to ø then there is a sense in which the thinker rationally ought 
to ø.” (40) Now, while it follows that if one is to spell correctly one ought to conform to the 
standards of spelling, it is doubtful that there is a non-trivial sense of ‘ought’ in which it is 
true that one ought to follow the standards of spelling. 
Does Wedgwood succeed in establishing that if one is rationally required to ø or to believe 
that p then one ought to ø or to believe that p? He discusses several objections, (the most 
important of which, the doubt about the normative implications of coherence, is addressed 
only in Chapter 9). According to the first objection normativity depends on how things are in 
the world whereas rationality is entirely mind dependent, hence they can come apart. Given 
that it can be bad to be rational, rational requirements are not normative. (34-5) Influenced 
by ‘the wrong kind of reasons’ writings Wedgwood suggests that the problem arises when 
“unusual costs and benefits, such as could be created by manipulative demons or eccentric 
billionaires” apply (41). In fact, such cost and benefits often arise in ordinary circumstances. 
For example, quite a few people may be able to obtain a job in the American Administration 
if they hold false views about its character. They may also do much good in the world in that 
case. Moreover, given what they know or are in position to know, it may be irrational of 
them to have those views, yet normatively speaking they should hold them, because having 
them is beneficial for them or for others.  
Wedgwood’s solution is to distinguish between two concepts of ought. He rejects the view 
that the distinction between right and wrong reasons is or tracks the distinction between 
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object and state reasons, because the latter cannot explain why whatever makes it irrational 
to believe a Moore-paradoxical proposition is a right reason for not believing it (45); nor can 
they explain why the reason not to intend to ø when you have reason to ø, and can ø 
(provided that you do not intend to ø), is the right reason (46). Instead he maintains that in 
the cases under consideration you ought to have a positive attitude toward a proposition 
that you ought not to have. In other words, you have a conflict precisely because you are 
subject to two conflicting ought propositions, though they express two different ought 
concepts (50). Wedgwood adds that ‘the right kind of reasons’ are constitutive of a kind of 
reasoning guiding us to an attitude or event. The wrong kind of reasons can be told apart by 
not being constitutive of such reasoning. 
The second objection is due to the fact that it is possible rationally to believe false 
propositions. In such cases it is irrational to give up one’s rational false beliefs, so that one is 
rationally required to believe a proposition that is false. If the belief is that you ought to ø, 
you are normatively required to have it even though it is not the case that you ought to ø. 
Hence rationality is not normative. Wedgwood rightly denies that the wide scope/narrow 
scope distinction refutes the objection. Instead he points out that as the rational is internal, 
supervening on the agent’s mental states and events, the oughts that rational requirements 
yield are ‘subjective’ or information-relative oughts, relativized to the epistemic perspective 
of the agent who is under discussion. The subjective ought is, according to Wedgwood, 
relative not to all the agent’s beliefs, but to a coherent epistemic perspective that he 
inhabits, which comprises experiences etc. besides beliefs, but is free of crazy or insane 
beliefs. In this he differs both from Parfit and Schroeder, who relativize to all and only 
beliefs, and from Kiesewetter and Lord, who relativize to available evidence only (Parfit 2011, 
pp. 111-113; Schroeder 2009, p. 223; Kiesewetter 2018; and Lord 2017, p. 504). While maintaining 
that what rationality requires is that one have beliefs required by one’s relatively coherent 
mental states, Wedgwood allows that there may be beliefs about what would be required 
from another epistemic perspective; thus, he maintains, the second objection is avoided 
(59-60). Wedgwood allows that: It ought1 to be that: if you believe that it ought2 to be that 
you now ø then you now ø. If the two oughts relate to different epistemic perspectives then 
no contradiction need follow. Assume two propositions belonging to two perspectives: (A) 
you ought to believe that B; (B) you ought now to . (The subscripts indicate that that 
‘ought’ is perspectival.) Even if B is false, it is possible that A is true, that is, that you ought1 
to believe that you ought2 to  now. If A and B relate to the same epistemic perspective, 
then Wedgwood requires that one cannot be rationally required to believe that A. 
The third objection, that rationality cannot be normative because ought implies can while 
what we rationally ought to believe or do need not be something we can believe or do, is 
treated to an extended discussion (chapter 3) of the semantics of ‘can’ in terms of 
dispositions and opportunities, explained within the framework of possible world semantics. 
Some readers will be disappointed that Wedgwood avoided a thorough discussion of the 
rationale of the ought implies can slogan, and its limits, as well as the entangled questions 
of the dependence, if any, of cognitive states on the will.   
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a criticism of a vague view called ‘Reasons First’, defined as 
holding that there is one central concept of normative reasons that is more basic and 
central than all other normative concepts (who belongs with this company is far from clear – 
I am given that honour but I deny that the concept of normative reasons is more basic than 
that of value). Wedgwood is familiar with a wide range of writings that he associates with 
this view, and he raises a number of issues they should and do contend with. Central to 
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those is the connection that all those writers point to (in their various ways) between the 
way normative reasons can guide people’s reactions to the way things are, and the way they 
could contribute to explanations of people’s reactions to the way things are. He points to a 
number of problems whose solution is required for ‘a normative reason’ to be this dual 
aspect concept. I found most instructive the suggestion that explanations of people’s 
responses to reasons (as I would prefer to put the point) include factors other than beliefs, 
or the facts they represent. Oddly, he refrains from discussing in detail any of the solutions 
offered to the questions he raised, presumably thinking that as there is no common Reasons 
First reply none can be given – true only in that as Reasons First writers disagree, no single 
set of solutions would satisfy all of them.   
Chapter 5 stands out in being the only one in the book offering a partial account of the 
meaning of an English word, ‘ought’. Borrowing from possible world semantic accounts of 
modal concepts Wedgwood’s account introduces probabilistic distributions to represent 
epistemic perspectives and a value function which evaluates alternatives relative to certain 
values. Wedgwood mentions that his preferred understanding of linguistic competence is 
through ability to use a word to express concepts within the range of concepts it can be 
used to express   – a plausible suggestion which would have led him in different directions, 
even when dealing with the range of semantic values of ‘ought’. 
Chapter 6 begins with what is perhaps an over-inclusive account of virtue. Basically, if a 
disposition is good its goodness is a virtue, and whenever the disposition is non-accidentally 
manifested the manifestation has that virtue (141). So, a disposition to sneeze which is good 
in relieving an itch has the virtue of relieving itches, and a particular sneeze is virtuous if it 
non-accidentally relieves that kind of itch. “It is abstractly rational for an agent to ø iff there 
is an available way for an agent to respond to her situation that would consist of the 
manifestation of rational dispositions, and would result in the agent ø-ing. Rational 
dispositions are all and only those dispositions that reliably lead the agent to respond to her 
situation in ways in which it is abstractly rational for her to respond”. (142) Disposition is a 
notoriously tricky concept. I suspect that Wedgwood’s discussion is not helpful. Consider 
the following examples: I am (1) disposed to stroke my hair in a certain way, roughly 
meaning that when I stroke my hair, intentionally or otherwise, then other things being 
equal I stroke it in that way, which involves a skill to stroke it pleasantly, without scratching 
my skull, and without drawing attention to the activity. I am also (2) disposed to stroke it 
when bored. Knowing that my friends are aware of this, I am (3) disposed to intentionally 
stroke it when I have reason to indicate that I am bored without saying so. I am stroking my 
hair right now. Which, if any, of my dispositions led me to do so? Not (1): it is usually 
manifested when I stroke my hair but never leads to my doing so. While manifested in my 
stroking my hair, (3), like (1) never leads to it. (2) may lead to it, but clearly not now, as I am 
stroking my hair to make a point, i.e. for a reason, and none of my hair stroking dispositions 
led to it. Did my disposition to be rational lead to it? Assuming that I have it, it is analogous 
to (3) above. It is a capacity to act for a reason, which I use when I act for a reason, but it 
does not lead me to act for a reason. So, dispositions are involved in rational responses, in 
various ways, and some may lead to a rational response. But we need a finer grained 
analysis than is to be found here to identify them and how they do so.  
As the chapter proceeds Wedgwood introduces subdivisions, which help in leading us closer 
to, say dispositions to behave in a virtuous way. But they do not explain the differences 
among dispositions, nor account for the type of dispositions that are involved in being 
rational. To do so we need an account of the difference between being led passively by 
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one’s dispositions (which is all that some virtues require) and being active, as one is when 
acting rationally in response to reasons – these matters remain unexplored.  
Chapter 7 provides an extensive defence of the internalism of rationality, as well as the 
claim that if it is rational for me to believe, intend etc. something then I ought (in some 
sense) to believe, intend, etc. it. The defence is an elaborate and careful statement of the 
argument from common content: “Consider two possible worlds, w1 and w2. In both worlds, 
you have exactly the same experiences, apparent memories, and intuitions and in both 
worlds you go through exactly the same processes of reasoning, forming, maintaining and 
revising exactly the same beliefs in exactly the same ways. It seems clear that these two 
worlds are also exactly alike with respect to which of your beliefs are rational and which are 
irrational. Now suppose that in w1 you are bedevilled by an evil demon who ensures that 
many of your experiences are misleading, with the result that many of the beliefs that you 
hold in w1 are false. In w2, on the other hand, almost all your experiences are veridical, with 
the result that almost all the beliefs that you hold in w2 are true. Intuitively, this makes no 
difference. Exactly the same beliefs are rational in both worlds.” (162). Wedgwood proceeds 
to defend and refine this kind of argument, considering its application to narrow content in 
twin earth arguments and to hallucination in the case of perception. It is one of the richest 
and best chapters in the book, but it does leave some questions. We judge the rationality of 
reasoning, and other activities involving our rational powers. But we also judge the 
rationality of the outcomes of such activities: have we acquired irrational beliefs as a result 
of irrational reasoning? Etc. Wedgwood’s arguments seem addressed at the activities, and 
leave one wondering about their results. An example: I may do something whose outcome 
depends on whether or not there is anything in my front garden. I believe that there is 
nothing, but decide, as I should, to re-examine the question. I do so, confirming my earlier 
belief. But my re-examination was sloppy and did not meet the standards of rationality that 
applied in the circumstances. My re-examination was, let us conclude, irrational. However, 
in the circumstances I acquired no false beliefs as a result. I believe, as I did before, that the 
front yard is empty. Is this belief irrational? It seems that it would be false to claim both that 
it is and that it is not. It is the outcome of my re-examination taken when I already believed 
that the yard is empty, and there is no truth of the matter whether I would have reached 
the same conclusion had I not that belief already (and remember that rationality is tested by 
recent mental events, so my belief cannot be irrational because of some event far in the 
past). Now change the example: during the processes of re-examination a new object was in 
fact placed in the yard. I would have become aware of it had the re-examination been 
rational. Now, it appears that my re-confirmed (and now false) belief that the yard is empty 
is irrational, because it is due to an irrational examination that led to a false conclusion. 
Wedgwood’s argument refines the kind of internalism he assumes (it is required for rational 
requirements to be capable of guiding reasoning, i.e. transition from some mental states to 
others), but I think that it is at odds with, or at least undecided in, cases in which that the 
conclusion is false is part of what makes it irrational. 
Here again Wedgwood’s argument turns on the existence of dispositions to react to some 
mental states or events by adopting or dropping others. The dispositions are constitutive of 
the type of mental states involved, and the requirements of rationality express their 
content. As before the account strikes me as incomplete, in failing to distinguish between 
passive conditional reflex type dispositions and those in which the agent is active in light of 
his or her understanding of the reasons he or she confronts.  
In suggesting that the account is incomplete I have not challenged Wedgwood’s assumption 
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that if rational requirements are constitutive we have a disposition to comply with them. 
But is this a non-sequitur? An alternative would go: when thinking about how things are, for 
any of the many reasons that may lead one to do so or for no reason at all, one thinks in 
ways which subject one’s thinking to the norms of that type of thought, meaning one 
accepts that violations of those norms would be a mistake. How does one know how to 
submit to norms of rationality? One learns gradually, from early childhood, as part of 
learning a language. Does one need to decide to use the capacity to subject one’s thinking 
to these norms? No, their use is a skill which is automatically engaged (not always 
successfully) whenever one thinks about how things are. Sometimes one does not subject 
oneself to these norms. These are not cases in which dispositions fail. They are cases of day 
dreaming, fantasising, etc., rather than thinking about how things are. So understood the 
norms of rationality are constitutive, but do not depend on any dispositions, at least not in 
the way imagined by Wedgwood. But if that is the constitutive nature of norms of 
rationality, their normativity has to be re-examined. 
For Wedgwood the route to normativity goes through the virtue of rationality, which is a 
special virtue, one of a “plethora of different values that are all non-relative” (i.e. do not 
depend on standards whose value is relative to some contingent aim) and yet the rational 
requirements it imposes (the ought propositions it makes true) do not conflict (as do other 
virtues and their requirements). Wedgwood thinks that it is in the nature of rationality that 
it has that character. There is no explanation of that. But there is a need to explain how such 
a virtue can exist. He briefly considers and rejects as inadequate to the task explanations 
based on Dutch book arguments and on the constitutive character of rational requirements. 
Rather, Wedgwood maps mental states and events present in the thinker’s mind at a given 
time onto a rational estimate of degree of incorrectness of every way of thinking, based on 
the assumption that the less irrational a way of thinking is the less it is likely to be incorrect. 
The bulk of chapter 9 explains this system of rational estimates of the probability of 
incorrectness. In other words, if we can attribute a rational probabilistic assessment of the 
degree of incorrectness of different ways of thinking we would be able to determine the 
degree of rationality of different ways of thinking: the smaller the probability that they are 
incorrect the less irrational they are. The aim of thinking is correctness and rationality is a 
means to correctness, a probability-based guide to what is less likely to be incorrect. 
There is much to discuss regarding the presuppositions of Wedgwood’s probabilistic 
assessment of degrees of incorrectness. But the suggestion is based on a few simpler 
assumptions that attract little attention in the book. In what way is rationality relevant to 
correctness? Some may think that it depends on the different categories of requirements of 
correctness. E.g. it may be a rational requirement not to believe a conjunction and the 
falsity of one of its conjuncts. And there may be an argument to take the correctness of a 
conjunction to be a reason for the correctness of each conjunct. Here a connection between 
rationality and correctness, though its precise form is not easy to state, seems plausible. But 
if my auditory experience can be a reason to believe that there is a cat around – is it a 
rational requirement for that belief? This is less clear in principle, and it is much more 
difficult to state the connection in detail. How about, my experience being a reason to 
believe that the person in front of me is getting irritated by my presence? It definitely may 
be good evidence for that belief, but what exactly is it that makes me irrational or less 
rational if I fail to perceive his irritation? Wedgwood’s identification of rational belief with 
justified belief requires that not only correctness but rationality is involved in all such cases. 
He may be right, but the case for that view is not made in the book.  
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It is a virtue of the book, which is sophisticated and dense with argument about all the 
matters it discusses, that it ends with a list of some of the questions that remain to be 
explored for its account of rationality to be acceptable. 
 
 
